Persons and their Properties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351198 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jason Stanley (0009-0002-5425-4834, Cornell University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 191 |
| Pages | 159-175 |
| Publication date | 1998-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00089 |
| OpenAlex | W1967488955 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 5 |
According to what I call "The Asymmetry Thesis", persons, though they are the direct bearers of the properties expressed by mental predicates, are not the direct bearers of properties such as those expressed by "weighs 135 pounds" or "has crossed legs".A number of different views of persons entail the Asymmetry Thesis.I first argue that the Asymmetry Thesis entails an error theory about our discourse involving person referring terms.I then argue that it is further threatened by consideration of the grounds we have for self-ascribing mental and physical predicates. Introduction.Neo-Lockeans about personal identity typically do not give explicit definitions of personhood.Rather, they supply contextual definitions, definitions of the form "For any x and y, x is the same person as y if and only if x bears psychological relation R to y".So, in an important sense, neo-Lockeans do not say what persons are.But whatever entities persons turn out to be, if the neo-Lockean is correct, they must satisfy the neo-Lockean contextual definition.Since the contextual definition given by neo-Lockean theorist invokes only psychological relations on the right hand side, and entities occupying different bodies
Library science · Physics · Volume (thermodynamics) · Classics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.15 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2021 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |