Realism and the Value of Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351238 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sean Johnson Andrews (0000-0002-0914-7928, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1305-1314 |
| Publication date | 2023-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqad052 |
| OpenAlex | W4376105765 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 13 |
Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma
Critical realism (philosophy of perception) · Dilemma · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Natural (archaeology) · Philosophical realism · Realism · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |