On The Sense and Reference of A Logical Constant

Bibliographic Data

ID4351273
AuthorsHarold Hodes, Harold T Hodes (0000-0002-0748-5704, Cornell University, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume54
Issue214
Pages134-165
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00345.x
OpenAlexW2101431654
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited7

Syntax precedes truth‐theoretic semantics when it comes to understanding a logical constant. A constant in a language is logical iff its sense is entirely constituted by certain deductive rules. To be sense‐constitutive, deductive rules governing a constant must meet certain conditions; those that do so are sense‐constitutive by virtue of understanders' conditional dispositions to feel compelled to accept certain formulae. Acceptance is a cognitive formula‐attitude. Since acceptance requires understanding, and a formula can contain more than one occurrence of logical constants, this account involves a ‘local holism’, but no circularity. I argue that no logical constant is ambiguous between a classical and a constructive sense; but I allow that one constant may have distinct classical and constructive ‘semantic values’. A logical constant's sense helps to determine its semantic value, but only together with certain constraints on satisfaction and frustration; it seems that the latter must include ‘convention T’‐style schemata

Algorithm · Constant (computer programming) · Constructive · Epistemology · Linguistics · Logical consequence · Programming language · Semantics (computer science) · Syntax · Truth table · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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