Pleasure, Pain, and Pluralism about Well-Being
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351340 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eden Lin (0000-0001-8210-8995, The Ohio State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 632-651 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae007 |
| OpenAlex | W4391592392 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 10 |
Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory must claim, then it seems that you could be made arbitrarily well off by being given enough of that good even if your life is hedonically terrible. My aim is to defend pluralistic theories against this objection. After replying to the simplest version of it, I will answer a more sophisticated version of it that has recently been leveled by Theron Pummer
Aesthetics · Epistemology · Pain and pleasure · Pleasure · Pluralism (philosophy) · Psychotherapist · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |