Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Separating action and knowledge

Bibliographic Data

ID4351373
AuthorsM Kelley (0000-0001-5131-0525, University of Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume75
Issue3
Pages956-977
Publication date2025-06-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae050
OpenAlexW4399055117
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited49

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing-knowledge that appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity

Action (physics) · Physics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

  • Trying without fail

    Open Access•Ben Holguín, Harvey Lederman•Philosophical Studies•2024

  • Occurrent knowledge is the sole aim of inquiry

    Leonardo Flamini•Inquiry•2026

  • The Rational Method

    Open Access•Jordan Scott•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2026

  • Knowledge and agential control

    Open Access•Markos Valaris•Synthese•2025

  • IV-Culpability and Ignorance

    Open Access•Gideon Rosen•Proceedings of the Aristotelian…•2003

  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

    Joshua Knobe•Analysis•2003

  • Intentional action in folk psychology

    Joshua Knobe•Philosophical Psychology•2003

  • Knowledge and Action

    John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley et al.•The Journal of Philosophy•2008

  • Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action

    Open Access•J Shepherd, J Adam Carter•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2023

  • Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control

    Open Access•J Adam Carter, J Shepherd•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • What we know when we act

    Open Access•Timothy R Kearl•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • The know-how solution to Kraemer's puzzle

    Open Access•Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne•Cognition•2023

  • Skills as Knowledge

    Carlotta Pavese, Bob Beddor•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2023

  • On the epistemic costs of implicit bias

    Open Access•Tamar Szabó Gendler•Philosophical Studies•2011

  • Essays on Actions and Events

    Donald Davidson, Donald Herbert Davidson•Essays on actions and events•2001

  • The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action

    Joshua Knobe, Arudra Burra•Journal of Cognition and Culture•2006

  • Knowledge and mentality

    Open Access•Carlotta Pavese•Philosophical Perspectives•2021

  • Varieties of Moral Encroachment

    Open Access•Renée Jorgensen Bolinger•Philosophical Perspectives•2020

  • Knowledge’s Boundary Problem

    Open Access•Stephen Hetherington•Synthese•2006

  • Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat

    Open Access•Timothy R Kearl•Synthese•2023

  • Know-how, action, and luck

    Open Access•Carlotta Pavese•Synthese•2021

  • The Logic of Aspect

    Johan Van Benthem, Antony Galton•The Philosophical Review•1986

  • Philosophy of Action

    Sarah K Paul, Sarah Paul•Philosophy of Action•2020

  • Knowledge and the state of nature

    Edward Craig•Knowledge and the state of nature•1990

  • Knowledge Out of Control

    Markos Valaris•The Philosophical Quarterly•2022

Unique citing works4
Citations per year2
Citation span2024 - 2026 (3)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae