Are You a Sim
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351504 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Weatherson (0000-0002-0830-141X, Brown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 212 |
| Pages | 425-431 |
| Publication date | 2003-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00323 |
| OpenAlex | W1988195351 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 5 |
Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose content is unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom's argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false; on the third it does not entail the conclusion; and on the fourth it only entails the conclusion given an auxiliary hypothesis which we have no reason to believe
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Simulation Expectation
Ancestor simulations and the Dangers of Simulation Probes
Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments
The real advantages of the simulation solution to the problem of natural evil
A-symmetric confirmation and anthropic skepticism
Simulation Theory in The Ontic and Epistemic Grounds of Kalām
The Simulation Argument
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |