Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351792 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Price (0000-0002-3190-4710, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 236 |
| Pages | 508-518 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.610.x |
| OpenAlex | W2027830930 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect‐switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect‐switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect‐switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural‐kind properties, such as being a tomato
Character (mathematics) · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Geometry · Color perception and design · Communication · Computer Science · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Psychology
Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties
Liberal phenomenal concepts
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology
Thinking mechanistically about perceptual learning
The Offload Response for Low-Level Theorists
The perceptual learning of socially constructed kinds
A disjointed account of the illusion of auditory continuity
The Phenomenology and Epistemology of Existence
Perception Without Propositions
Visual experience
Untying the knot
Other minds are neither seen nor inferred
Let sleeping dogs lie
Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism about Phenomenal Properties
The Price of Twin Earth
| Citations per year | 1.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |