Intentionality and the Physical
A New Theory of Disposition Ascription
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351839 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Mumford (0000-0001-9614-4399, University of Nottingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 195 |
| Pages | 215-225 |
| Publication date | 1999-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00138 |
| OpenAlex | W2034120319 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 11 |
This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences
Appeal · Ascription · Categorical variable · Disposition · Epistemology · Intentionality · Logical consequence · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Quine · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Philosophy · Psychology
Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
In Defense of Dispositions
Analytical Philosophy
Intentionality and the Non-Psychological
Fact, fiction, and forecast
Dispositions and Conditionals
Conditionals, Functional Essences and Martin on Dispositions
Finkish Dispositions
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |