Interacting with Emotions

Imagination and Supposition

Bibliographic Data

ID4351929
AuthorsMargherita Arcangeli (0000-0002-3642-090X, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume67
Issue269
Pages730-750
Publication date2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx007
OpenAlexW2590253836
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited21

A widespread claim, which I call ‘the Emotionality Claim’ (EC), is that imagination but not supposition is intimately linked to emotion. In more cognitive jargon, imagination is connected to the affect system (i.e., the mechanisms that produce emotional responses), whereas supposition is not. EC is open to several interpretations which yield very different views about the nature of supposition. The literature lacks an in-depth analysis of EC which sorts out these different readings and ways to carve supposition and imagination at their joints. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. I shall argue that existing readings of EC fail to properly account for the emotional asymmetry between imagination and supposition. The tendency is to start from narrow conceptions of both imagination and supposition. I shall argue for a novel interpretation of EC pivoting on different ways a mental state can connect to the affect system.

Aesthetics · Affect (linguistics) · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Emotionality · Epistemology · Imagination · Interpretation (philosophy) · Jargon · Linguistics · Mental state · State (computer science) · Communication · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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