Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351930 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Cowie (0000-0003-2179-1254, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 256 |
| Pages | 407-422 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqu028 |
| OpenAlex | W2335415730 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 22 |
One recently popular strategy for avoiding the moral error theory is via a ‘companions in guilt’ argument. I focus on those recently popular arguments that take epistemic facts as a companion in guilt for moral facts. I claim that there is an internal tension between the two main premises of these arguments. It is a consequence of this that either the soundness or the dialectical force of the companions in guilt argument is undermined. I defend this claim via (i) analogy with philosophical debates concerning the indispensability of mathematical objects to natural science, and (ii) discussion of the ‘entanglement’ of epistemic concepts and moral concepts in deliberation. I conclude by proposing a positive view of what kind of argument must be used if moral error theories are to be successfully undermined
Physics · Psychoanalysis · Thermodynamics · Work (physics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument
Reconceiving Murdochian Realism
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness
The Limits of Self-Effacement
Evolutionary debunking
Love and the Moral Error Theory
Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking
Ontological Entanglement in the Normative Web
Dear Prudence
Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Still Work
Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments
Companions in guilt arguments
Making Things Possible
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2023 (9) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |