The Weaknesses of Weak Preemptionism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351971 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rico Hauswald (Dresden University of Technology, Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 37-55 |
| Publication date | 2020-12-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaa024 |
| OpenAlex | W3024596515 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 17 |
According to preemptionism, a layperson should treat the fact that an epistemic authority believes p as a reason to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. Many authors have found the unqualified version of preemptionism, as defended by Linda Zagzebski, too strong. At the same time, a number of them have recently advocated weakened or qualified preemptionist accounts. In this paper, I criticise these accounts. I argue that some of them cannot explain the possibility of rational persistent disagreements between laypeople and epistemic authorities, while those that can explain it fail to account either for the extent to which justification is a holistic phenomenon or for the role of what I call 'control reasons' in the laypeople's epistemic conduct
Control (management) · Economics · Epistemology · Layperson · Phenomenon · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |