Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351977 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Filippo Ferrari (0000-0001-6770-8124, University of Aberdeen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 264 |
| Pages | 516-535 |
| Publication date | 2016-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqv116 |
| OpenAlex | W2285247908 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 19 |
I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); and (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgements of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth governs judgement to substantiate the thesis that truth's normative function varies according to the subject matter at issue. I then argue that truth's normative guidance in the domain of taste is characteristically weak. I introduce an intuitive distinction between basic and refined taste, and show how this distinction affects questions of faultlessness and parity. Last, I discuss the idea of alethic suberogation in connection with disagreement about refined taste.
Art · Art history · Humanities · Taste · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Neuroscience · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |