How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist

Bibliographic Data

ID4352002
AuthorsDaniel J Singer (0000-0002-8272-4250, University of Pennsylvania, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume68
Issue272
Pages580-602
Publication date2018-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx056
OpenAlexW2781933887
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited30

Epistemic consequentialists think that epistemic norms are about believing the truth and avoiding error. Recently, a number of authors have rejected epistemic consequentialism on the basis that it incorrectly sanctions tradeoffs of epistemic goodness. Here, I argue that epistemic consequentialists should borrow two lessons from ethical consequentialists to respond to these worries. Epistemic consequentialists should construe their view as an account of right belief, which they distinguish from other notions like rational and justified belief. Epistemic consequentialists should also make their view ‘sophisticated,’ in the sense of Railton. Epistemic consequentialism, I conclude, is best construed as sharing much of its structure with prominent act-consequentialist views in ethics. Epistemic consequentialism has an advantage over its ethical counterpart though: the key claim of the view is practically universally accepted, which gives us an additional reason to think it’s true.

Consequentialism · Epistemology · Objectivism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy

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