Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry

Bibliographic Data

ID4352008
AuthorsDavid Liggins (0000-0001-6944-5970, University of Manchester, corresponding author)
Year2015
Pagespqv063
Publication date2015-08-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv063
OpenAlexW2205087710
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited27

Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ' is true because Rex is barking' but reject 'Rex is barking because is true'. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry: they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer a pair of objections to the proposal and defend them from counter-objections. To conclude, I discuss how else to explain the asymmetry, and set out the implications for deflationism and correspondence theories of truth

Asymmetry · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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