Can We have Justified Beliefs about Fundamental Properties

Bibliographic Data

ID4352046
AuthorsDarren Bradley (0000-0002-4410-8633, Philosophy, University of Leeds , UK, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume74
Issue1
Pages46-67
Publication date2023-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqad012
OpenAlexW4321786470
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited35

An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental

Algorithm · Connection (principal bundle) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Sketch · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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