Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief

Bibliographic Data

ID4352047
AuthorsT Raleigh (0000-0001-5056-0039, United Arab Emirates University, United Arab Emirates), Filippo Vindrola (Ruhr University Bochum)
Year2021
Volume71
Issue2
Pages378-406
Publication date2021-03-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa047
OpenAlexW3040452722
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited33

According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still to be favoured over the perceptual confidence view

Cognitive psychology · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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