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Knowledge Out of Control

Bibliographic Data

ID4352095
AuthorsMarkos Valaris (0000-0002-7254-3253, UNSW Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume72
Issue3
Pages733-753
Publication date2022-06-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqab059
OpenAlexW3214942403
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited53

According to a thesis famously associated with Anscombe'sIntention, knowledge is a necessary condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call this the Agential Knowledge thesis. The Agential Knowledge thesis remains, of course, controversial. Furthermore, as even some of its proponents acknowledge, it can appear puzzling: Why should acting intentionally require knowing what you are doing? My aim in this paper is to propose an explanation and defence of the Agential Knowledge thesis, based on the idea that acting intentionally is exercising control, in a relevant sense. My argument rests on two things: first, articulating a modal conception of the relevant sense of control, and, secondly, arguing that agential knowledge is distinctively practical (in a sense I explain). As I explain, the truth of the Agential Knowledge thesis opens promising paths for future work in the philosophy of action

Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Cognitive science · Common sense · Control (management · Epistemology · Self-knowledge · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

  • A Control Theory of Action

    M Kelley•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2025

  • Knowledge and agential control

    Open Access•Markos Valaris•Synthese•2025

  • Separating action and knowledge

    Open Access•M Kelley•The Philosophical Quarterly•2025

  • Epistemological Disjunctivism

    Duncan Pritchard•Epistemological Disjunctivism•2012

  • Between Probability and Certainty

    Martin Smith•Between Probability and Certainty•2016

  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

    Joshua Knobe•Analysis•2003

  • Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

    Duncan Pritchard, Inc Journal of Philosophy•The Journal of Philosophy•2012

  • Intentional action in folk psychology

    Joshua Knobe•Philosophical Psychology•2003

  • Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge

    Open Access•Laurence Bonjour, Philosophy Documentation Center•Midwest Studies in Philosophy•1980

  • Action, Knowledge, and Will

    John Hyman•Action, Knowledge, and Will•2015

  • The normality of error

    Open Access•Sam Carter, Simon Goldstein•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • Agential Knowledge, Action and Process

    Open Access•Ben Wolfson•Theoria•2012

  • Life and Action

    Michael Thompson•Life and Action•2008

  • Things in Progress

    Open Access•Zoltan Szabo•Philosophical Perspectives•2008

  • Unreasonable Knowledge

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen Aarnio•Philosophical Perspectives•2010

  • Explaining Action

    Kieran Setiya•The Philosophical Review•2003

  • Knowledge and the Internal

    John Mcdowell•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1995

  • Modal Virtue Epistemology

    Open Access•Bob Beddor, Carlotta Pavese•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2018

  • Knowledge in Action

    Open Access•John Gibbons•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

  • The progressive

    Open Access•Fred Landman•Natural Language Semantics•1992

  • How Knowledge Works

    John Hyman•The Philosophical Quarterly•1999

  • Actually Knowing

    Stephen Hetherington•The Philosophical Quarterly•1998

Unique citing works3
Citations per year3
Citation span2025 - 2025 (1)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3
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