Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry

Bibliographic Data

ID4352115
AuthorsFrank Hindriks (0000-0002-5818-4071, University of Groningen, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume58
Issue233
Pages630-641
Publication date2008-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.551.x
OpenAlexW2140722273
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited2

Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First., people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has a normative component. I propose a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect. This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action. The praise-blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not

Action (physics · Blame · Physics · Praise · Free Will and Agency · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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