Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4352116
AutoresHelen Beebee (0000-0001-7650-3622, University of Manchester, autor de correspondencia)
Año2001
Volumen51
Número204
Páginas356-374
Fecha de publicación2001-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00234
OpenAlexW2064630986
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas3

Martin Davies argues that ‘limitation principles’ block the transfer of warrant from the premises of a certain kind of argument to its conclusion. The class of arguments in question includes Moore's argument for the existence of the external world, and a popular style of argument which starts from two premises that are warranted by first‐person authority and semantic externalism respectively, ending with a conclusion that does not, allegedly, admit of a priori justification. I argue that the relevant class of arguments can be shown to be unconvincing without appealing to any limitation principles, by showing that they beg the question against sceptical opponents. Principles limiting the transfer of warrant are not required in order to rebut the claim that first‐person authority and semantic externalism are incompatible

Argument (complex analysis) · Begging · Class (philosophy) · Economics · Epistemology · Externalism · Skepticism · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science