Between Deflationism and Inflationism
A Moderate View on Truth and Reference
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352156 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham Seth Moore (0000-0003-2080-632X, University of British Columbia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 673-694 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-03 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab058 |
| OpenAlex | W3213619021 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 15 |
This essay argues for a two-part thesis concerning the deflationist theories of truth and reference. First, I identify two points of contrast between the deflationist theories and their traditional inflationary opponents: (1) they each employ different orders of explanation for the variety of semantic phenomena, and (2) the inflationist is typically taken to be beholden to a reductive explanation of reference, whereas the deflationist is doubtful of this project. Secondly, I argue that these two points of contrast need not come together to exhaust the space of possible views. There is room for a plausible middle ground: a moderate version of inflationism. My moderate inflationism will reject the deflationist's order of explanation, so it counts as genuinely inflationary. However, it also rejects the reductionist ambitions of the earlier inflationists, so it isn't an apt target for deflationary scepticism
Contrast (vision) · Economics · Epistemology · Linguistics · Order (exchange) · Reductionism · Skepticism · Space (punctuation) · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |