The Pareto Argument and Inequality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352174 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Patrick Shaw (University of Glasgow, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 196 |
| Pages | 353-368 |
| Publication date | 1999-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00147 |
| OpenAlex | W1981466147 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 12 |
The Pareto argument for inequality holds that any change from a position of equality to one of inequality is justified so long as everyone benefits from the change. G.A. Cohen criticizes this argument (which he attributes to Rawls) on the ground that changes can normally be found which preserve both equality and Pareto‐efficiency. However, this does not resolve the basic conflict between the two desiderata. Strong egalitarians hold that Pareto changes are not for the better if they increase inequality too greatly. Thus if the Pareto argument holds, then strong egalitarianism is unsustainable. I argue that egalitarians need not be troubled by the Pareto argument for inequality. The Pareto criterion would not be widely accepted unless it takes account of moral harms; but if it does take account of moral harms then there is no reason to doubt that egalitarian concerns can be incorporated into the Pareto argument
Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Egalitarianism · Inequality · Mathematical economics · Neoclassical economics · Pareto principle · Political science · Politics · Position (finance) · Positive economics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,24 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |