The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352240 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Francesco Orsi (0000-0002-4984-1033, University of Tartu, Estonia) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 280 |
| Pages | 652-655 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqz075 |
| OpenAlex | W2987706177 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
Despite the significant amount of recent work on the question of whether value and other properties should or not be understood in terms of normative reasons, A. C. Ewing's 67 pages in The Definition of Good (1948) had remained, until Rowland's book, the lengthiest single treatment of these questions. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first book-length defence of (a version of) what is perhaps the current majority view in this debate: varieties of value, and in fact other properties such as wrongness, oughts, and fittingness, should all be understood in terms of normative reasons for pro-attitudes or actions. Rowland thus embraces a ‘reasons-first’ approach to questions of intra-normative primacy. I illustrate the book's contents, and then raise one worry. Most of the book (chs. 1–9) consists in the defence of a buck-passing account of value (BPA). In general: BPA. What it is for X to be good or of value is just for there to be reasons for some (particular) set of agents to have pro-attitudes in response to X. (8
Epistemology · Expressivism · Normative · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Worry · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Philosophy · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.83 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2024 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |