Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352249 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Black (0000-0003-4930-0584, California State University, Northridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 233 |
| Pages | 597-617 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.554.x |
| OpenAlex | W1977057871 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 10 |
Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge
Closure (psychology) · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Physics · Political science · Skepticism · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2022 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |