Fragmentalism We can Believe in
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352268 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gabrielly Merlo (0000-0002-1816-1844, University of Geneva, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 184-205 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqac005 |
| OpenAlex | W4210494888 |
| Language | NL |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 20 |
This paper argues that what is currently the most popular version of temporal Fragmentalism-'unstructured' temporal Fragmentalism, as I shall call it-faces a problem of Tensed Belief Explosion. Four possible solutions to this problem are reviewed and shown to be wanting; two more promising ones risk fostering scepticism about the existence of tensed facts-hence, about Fragmentalism itself. The tentative moral is that unstructured versions of Fragmentalism are at best unmotivated and at worst seriously flawed
Epistemology · Skepticism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |