An Empirical Assessment of Informal Influence in the World Bank

Bibliographic Data

ID4360697
AuthorsChristopher Kilby (0000-0003-0991-3001, Villanova University, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume61
Issue2
Pages431-464
Publication date2013-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomic Development and Cultural Change (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0079 • E-ISSN: 1539-2988
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/668278
OpenAlexW2001737282
LanguageEN
Citations received36
References cited23

Recent scholarship has uncovered convincing evidence of systematic donor influence in international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Less clear is how donors influence international financial institutions’ decisions. Possible avenues are formal and informal: formal influence through official decisions of the Board of Executive Directors and informal influence over decisions not made at the board level. This article explores the role of informal influence at the World Bank by examining the flow of funds after loans are approved. Controlling for commitments (loan approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the geopolitical interests of important donors? Since the Board of Executive Directors is formally involved in loan approval but not in disbursement decisions, this provides an interesting case to identify the avenues of influence. The results indicate the scope of reforms needed to bolster the independence of the World Bank

Business · Economic growth · Economics · Empirical evidence · Executive board · Independence (probability theory) · Loan · Management · Scholarship · Scope (computer science) · Accounting · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Growth and Development · Finance · International Development and Aid

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