Perception, Pretence and Reality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4375692 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Edmond Wright (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 513 |
| Publication date | 1983-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Poetics Today (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0333-5372 • E-ISSN: 1527-5507 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1772030 |
| OpenAlex | W2329062136 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 8 |
Two decades ago it was possible for a philosopher of perception, R.J. Hirst (1959:42), to call it a common story that all we ever beheld were what is called sense-data, something immediately sensed that acted as a kind of veil or screen between ourselves and the outer world. It is traceable to Locke's conception of there being ideas in the mind which in some way represented the objects we perceive about us. So successful have been the attacks on this outworn theory, which was shown to involve not only bizarre implications such as the body-image that we feel not being the same as our real body, but the more serious philosophical one of solipsism. could we ever compare the object on the screen to what it represented? In the case of a television screen I can go and look at what is in front of the camera, even see object and screen simultaneously, but I could never do this with an object and an image in the mind. Furthermore, talk of sense-data brought in such queer logic, so many unexpected ambiguities, that there was a distinct fishiness that could only indicate fallacy somewhere. How do you count sense-data? asked W.H.F. Barnes (1944/5: 89-117). But coloured shapes can be naturally and properly said to be things we actually see! said J.L. Austin (1962:136). A person thinking that he can see a representation is like someone thinking he can eat a direct object because he can eat a meal, said G.E.M. Anscombe (1965:158-180). How can the speckles on a representation of a hen be determinate and indeterminate at the same time? asked R.M. Chisholm (1942:368-373). who is looking at this supposed representation? asked Gilbert Ryle (1949:213220) A little man in your head? And does he have eyes in turn, and sense-data in turn? And most familiar of all, that of Wittgenstein: How can you talk of red, say, as a 'private object' when you need public criteria for the word in the first place? (1967
Cognitive psychology · Perception · Color perception and design · Multisensory perception and integration · Neuroscience · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 1986 - 1990 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |