Fantastic Phenomenology
Quixote Reconsidered
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4386660 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Hull (0000-0001-5534-4482, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 35 |
| Publication date | 1989-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | SubStance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0049-2426 • E-ISSN: 1527-2095 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3685309 |
| OpenAlex | W2325911945 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
FANTASY LITERATURE SUSPENDS established truth and reality. Yet fantasy theory relies on unquestioned norms of convention, and never asks what it means to suspend them.1 Theoretical definitions of fantasy rely on formal distinctions-the real vs. the unreal, the known vs. the impossiblewithout examining the premises upon which these antithetical notions are based. However, a proper theory of fantasy must ask just what the reality is that's being suspended. To develop a fantasy theory that escapes norm, convention, and the self-evident, we must turn to something like Husserl's phenomenology in which ready-made reality is suspended. Husserl called everyday reality transcendental naivete (Crisis 189), and, in order to escape the conventional thinking it entailed, he developed an intellectual procedure that parallels fantasy's suspension of reality. He called this procedure the bracketing of the known and accepted world. Heidegger explains bracketing as the phenomenological suspension of the thesis of existence (History 100), and says it allows us to focus on what something is without having to consider whether it exists. The bracketing of a whole sphere of consciousness, or world, is called reduction
Art · Epistemology · Literature · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Psychoanalysis · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics · Psychology · Violence, Religion, and Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |