Nuclear Reason

At the Limits of Strategy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4444800
AutoresAnthony Burke (0000-0002-4599-2272, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen23
Número4
Páginas506-529
Fecha de publicación2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Relations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0047-1178 • E-ISSN: 1741-2862
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0047117809348697
OpenAlexW2140003126
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11

Is nuclear strategic reason rational? Barack Obama's April 2009 speech looking towards a world free of nuclear weapons appeared to promise positive new directions in global disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet it came on the heels of one of the most destabilising periods in global nuclear security since the early 1980s. This article argues that the growing interpenetration of nuclear and conventional conflict, and the dangers of nuclear terrorism, provide disarmament with compelling security logic. However, progress will hinge on key states adopting nuclear postures that reduce nuclear dangers and can acknowledge the fundamental impossibility of nuclear strategy as a system of reason: one that has never been able to connect nuclear means and security ends in a way that is either viable or legitimate. In an era of radically asymmetric conflict and competition, disarmament is an imperative, but to succeed it must find a rational way through strategic irrationality

Disarmament · Impossibility · Irrationality · Law and economics · Nuclear ethics · Nuclear strategy · Nuclear terrorism · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Rationality · Sociology · Terrorism · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense