Realism and great power subversion

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4445323
AutoresWilliam C Wohlforth (Dartmouth College, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume34
Fascículo4
Páginas459-481
Data de publicação2020-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInternational Relations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0047-1178 • E-ISSN: 1741-2862
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0047117820968858
OpenAlexW3097114539
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas16

I present a realist theory of subversion among great powers, an understudied phenomenon in the burgeoning literature on subversive statecraft. I show that a simple, rational cost-benefit calculus accounts for comparatively low-levels of subversion among non-belligerent great powers, much higher levels among belligerent great powers, and more frequent, violent and larger-scale subversion against weaker targets. Brief case studies of mid-twentieth century subversion featuring the Soviet Union and the United States illustrate the theory and provide preliminary support. Theory and evidence show that the conditions that are conducive to highly consequential subversion among great powers are quite limited and reversible. This gives rise to skepticism concerning claims that today's strategic environment has fundamentally transformed the nature of great power rivalry so as to accord a newly central place to subversion

Belligerent · Epistemology · Law and economics · Phenomenon · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Realism · Sociology · Subversion · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Philosophy · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East