Husserl

This paper wants to clarify the concepts of “meaning” and “sense”, of which Husserlian phenomenology makes constant use even though it remains far from any hermeneutical perspective as from any linguistic philosophy. Whether in form of the “interpretative sense” and the “fulfilling sense” in the Logical Investigations or in form of the “noematic sense” which emerges in the Ideas, it appears that the notion of meaning is inseparable from the thesis of the object’s being-constituted, but forbids at the same time any mentalist account of it. As a non-objectifiable medium in any relation to an object, this “meaning” cannot be identified with a Fregean Sinn but must be recognized as the fundamental operative concept of Husserlian phenomenology, from which its transcendental idealism is to be understood

Epistemology · Linguistics · Transcendental number · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism

• Sense-Bestowal and Sense-Withdrawal

  Open Access•Remus Breazu•Human Studies•2024

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