Central bank power without central bank autonomy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4495178 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nathan Coombs (0000-0002-7319-1181, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 65-68 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Finance and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2059-5999 • E-ISSN: 2059-5999 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2218/fas.2023.8 |
| OpenAlex | W4392546582 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
Leon Wansleben's new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book's recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book's ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest
Autonomy · Business · Central bank · Economics · Financial system · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Economic Theory and Policy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |