Disagreement and Controversy in History

Historians and philosophers have argued that historical inquiries are different in kind from the inquiries of the natural sciences, because the subject-matter of human behavior demands a method irreducibly sensitive to elements of whim or personal preference. I think that the standard line of argument which leads to this conclusion has been turned effectively by Ernest Nagel, who has shown that it rests upon a radical misunderstanding of the methods of the natural sciences and of the obligations which must be accepted by any discipline which claims intellectual respectability.' Nonetheless, the power of Nagel's objections has not swept the detractors of history from the field and, moreover, raises substantial questions about the objective adequacy of historical accounts. For the critic of history can point to the manifest controversies about matters of fact which appear to divide competent investigators in the field and suggest, as a result, that practicing historians have not adopted the methodological safeguards which are in theory available to them and which would preserve them, if adopted, from irresponsible or idiosyncratic judgments. The critic of history can suggest that no mere recitation of facts appears sufficient to resolve controversies about the truth of propositions which purportedly describe or explain them and conclude, therefore, that such propositions are maintained because they appeal to the whims or prejudices of the historians who advocate them. W. H. Walsh has suggested, for example, that any adequate defense of history must blunt the point of the charge that the spectacle of interminable disagreements among historians is fatal for any claims which that discipline can have upon intellectual respectability

Epistemology · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science