A Reappraisal of Comte's Three-State Law

Bibliographic Data

ID4496334
AuthorsWarren Schmaus (0000-0001-5797-0903, corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume21
Issue2
Pages248
Publication date1982-05-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2505247
OpenAlexW2313934624
LanguageEN
Citations received7

Misconceptions about Comte's three-state law abound in the historical and philosophical literature. It is usually believed that Comte claims that societies as a whole pass through the theological, metaphysical, and positive states, with each of these states representing some sort of organic whole including all aspects of society. Transitions from one state to the next are seen as representing historical discontinuities.' Commentators also hold that the law is based on a priori considerations concerning human nature and not on history.2 Through an exegetical analysis of Comte's three-state law, his arguments in support of this law, and his views on historical method, I hope to show that all of these beliefs are false. In doing so, I am not attempting to secure Comte's three-state law on a firm foundation so much as to remove a certain kind of objection to it. This objection, which has been most clearly expressed by Popper, states that it is not properly speaking a law at all, but rather a mere historical trend or pattern of development.3

Epistemology · Political science · State (computer science) · Economic Theory and Institutions · History · Law · Legal and Social Philosophy · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Economy and Marxism

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