Progress in Historical Studies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4496575 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Raymond Martins, Raymond Martin (University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 14-39 |
| Publication date | 1998-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | History and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-2303.00036 |
| OpenAlex | W2094114912 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
Has there been progress in historical studies, in the sense that we understand the past better now than previously? I argue that there has been such progress. In the case of the interpretational controversy over the American Revolution, it has consisted, among other things, in the development of interpretations that are more accurate, more comprehensive, better balanced, and better justified. In addition, the repeated development of interpretations with these characteristics has encouraged interpretational convergence, if not overall, then at least within what I call interpretive polarities, of which the competition between Whig- and Progressive-oriented interpretations of the Revolution is an example. Further, except for a certain sort of ignorance about human nature coupled with the desire for richer and more relevant interpretational meaning, probably there would have been even more convergence. However, the use of interpretational convergence as a criterion of progress in historical studies rests on a profound and widespread misunderstanding of the differences between historical studies and the physical sciences. Interpretational divergence is not necessarily a bad thing. In the case of the controversy over the Revolution, we should want even more interpretational divergence than we have gotten so far, provided it is of the right kind. The seeming-descensus that results, far from being an embarrassment to historical studies, should be regarded as one of its best features. Finally, in response to predictable relativistic and skeptical objections, there are, if not external checks on the adequacy of historical interpretations, then something that is close enough to such checks to promote a kind of growth in historical understanding that is progress worth caring about
Competition (biology) · Convergence (economics) · Divergence (linguistics) · Economics · Embarrassment · Epistemology · Ignorance · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Positive economics · Skepticism · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Political Science Research and Education · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1998 - 2022 (25) |
| Highly cited | No |