Analogy, Natural History and the Philosophy of Nature

Bibliographic Data

ID4504690
AuthorsDalia Nassar (0000-0001-6018-5949, The University of Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume9
Issue2
Pages240-257
Publication date2015-08-14
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the Philosophy of History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1872-261X • E-ISSN: 1872-2636
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1163/18722636-12341302
OpenAlexW1142796716
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited1

In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784-1785), in which he not only challenges Herder's conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant's complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant's critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant's own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder's use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant's thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant's transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori "metaphysics of nature" and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant

Analogy · Epistemology · Humanity · Metaphysics · Theology · Historical Philosophy and Science · History of Science and Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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