Experiment as a Second-Order Concept

Bibliographic Data

ID4516027
AuthorsYehuda Elkana (Tel Aviv University, corresponding author)
Year1988
Volume2
Issue1
Pages177-196
Publication date1988-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueScience in Context (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0269-8897 • E-ISSN: 1474-0664
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0269889700000545
OpenAlexW2129001943
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited12

The ArgumentWhen we actually perform an experiment, we do many different things simultaneously - some belonging to the realm of theory, some to the realms of methodology and technique; however, a great deal of what happens is expressible in terms of socially determined images of knowledge or in terms of concepts of reflectivity - second-order concepts - namely thoughts about thoughts.The emergence of experiment as a second-order concept in late antiquity exemplifies the historical development of second-order concepts; it is shown to be rooted in the Sophists' cunning reason (Greek metis) and is followed up in the work of Ptolemy, Copernicus and Galileo.Then, by way of epistemological explication, the three levels of representation of an experiment are shown to be analogous to Baxandall's three levels of representation of a picture.Finally it is shown that such an interpretation only makes sense in terms of two-tier thinking: realism, inside a conceptual framework which is chosen or arrived at, relativistically

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Explication · Galileo (satellite navigation) · Geography · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Order (exchange) · Ptolemy's table of chords · Realism · Realm · Representation (politics) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · History · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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