Knowing in Aristotle part 1

Epistēmē, Nous, and non-rational cognitive states

Bibliographic Data

ID4524681
AuthorsCaleb M Cohoe (0000-0002-8063-2950, Metropolitan State University of Denver, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume17
Issue1
Publication date2022-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12801
OpenAlexW4200488038
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited26

I present an overview of the features Aristotle attributes to gnōsis (cognition or knowledge), a term Aristotle applies to true cognitive states, whether rational or non-rational. Gnōsis is being in contact with reality. This, for Aristotle, happens when the soul takes on the form of the object known, which is what makes gnōsis factive. I present Aristotle's account of non-rational cognitive states, discussing perception and experience (empeiria) and the role they play in acquiring knowledge. I then cover Aristotle's understanding of belief (hupolēpsis) and opinion (doxa) and lay out why he thinks they cannot be excellences. I conclude with an overview of two of the most important and foundational excellences of reason, nous (comprehension or understanding) and epistēmē (scientific knowledge

Cognition · Cognitive science · Comprehension · Doxa · Epistemology · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Perception · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology

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