Disconnected Fire Alarms and Ineffective Police Patrols
Legislative Oversight in Postauthoritarian Chile
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4547351 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter M Siavelis (0000-0002-6198-8206, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 71-98 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-1937 • E-ISSN: 2162-2736 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/166466 |
| OpenAlex | W4229586224 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 15 |
In many Latin American countries, corruption and administrative inefficiency have emerged as significant threats to democracy and governability. This case study employs McCubbins and Schwartz's U.S.-centered model of "fire alarm" and "police patrol" oversight to analyze how effectively Chile's Congress has conducted its oversight functions. Chile's experience with authoritarian rule, the weakening of Congress, and changes in the relationships between citizens and state institutions have undermined its tradition of fire alarm oversight, forcing Congress to rely on less-effective police patrol activities
ALARM · Authoritarianism · Democracy · Economics · Governor · Inefficiency · Language change · Latin Americans · Legislature · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration
Inhibitory Institutions
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Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
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Determinantes do controle horizontal em parlamentos reativos
The Organizational Consequences of Politics
Friends in High Places
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Keeping a watchful eye
Presidents and Assemblies
Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy
Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America
Building democratic institutions
Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile
Market reforms and corruption in Latin America
The Tides of Reform
Why Is the Transition to Democracy Proving So Difficult in Chile
Understanding Political Change After Authoritarian Rule
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,52 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2026 (26) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |