Moral hazard effects of supplemental private health insurance in Korea
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4594453 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hansoo Ko (0000-0002-3321-0763, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 265 |
| Pages | 113325 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Science & Medicine (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0277-9536 • E-ISSN: 1873-5347 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113325 |
| PMID | 32905966 |
| OpenAlex | W2969776895 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 41 |
Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Auto insurance risk selection · Business · Casualty insurance · Census · Economic growth · Economics · Environmental health · General insurance · Group insurance · Health care · Health insurance · Incentive · Income protection insurance · Insurance policy · Microdata (statistics · Moral hazard · Morale hazard · Political science · Popularity · Population · Private insurance · Self-insurance · Welfare · Global Health Care Issues · Health disparities and outcomes · Healthcare Systems and Reforms · Medicine
Can supplementary private health insurance further supplement health
The poverty prevention effects of health insurance
Deconstructing subjective unmet healthcare needs
The impact of benefits coverage expansion of social health insurance
Can supplementary private health insurance reduce vulnerability to expected poverty and catastrophic health expenditure in China
The efficient moral hazard effect of health insurance
Has South Korea achieved the goals of national health insurance? Trends in financial protection of households between 2011 and 2018
Explaining income‐related inequalities in doctor utilisation in Europe
Chapter 7 The human capital model
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability
Thirty years of national health insurance in South Korea
Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables
Sources of Advantageous Selection
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
| Citations per year | 1.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |