Should Chimpanzees Have Standing? The Case for Pursuing Legal Personhood for Non-Human Animals

Bibliographic Data

ID4610149
AuthorsAlexia Staker (corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume6
Issue3
Pages485-507
Publication date2017-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTransnational Environmental Law (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2047-1025 • E-ISSN: 2047-1033
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s204710251700019x
OpenAlexW2753720897
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited24

Examples abound of national and international legal developments that indicate growing concern and respect for animals. However, a key barrier remains: animals are not recognized as legal persons and therefore do not have standing to pursue independent legal action. This significantly limits the scope for legal redress when animals' interests are harmed. This article examines recent attempts in the United States and Europe to establish standing for animals via strategic litigation and the barriers that have so far undermined this project. The article argues that, despite their lack of success to date, cases that seek to establish standing for animals should continue to be pursued. Societal views about the value of animals' lives are continually evolving such that these cases may soon be successful. Furthermore, even if unsuccessful, these cases help in creating the socio-cultural space required to redefine the human-animal divide and potentially transform animals into rights bearers

Animal rights · Legal status · Personhood · Redress · Scope (computer science · Value (mathematics · Environmental law and policy · Geographies of human-animal interactions · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses

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