The Four Faces of Bandung

Detainees, Soldiers, Revolutionaries and Statesmen

Bibliographic Data

ID4748256
AuthorsPang Yang Huei (0000-0002-5583-1966, National University of Singapore, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume39
Issue1
Pages63-86
Publication date2009-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Contemporary Asia (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0047-2336 • E-ISSN: 1752-7554
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00472330802506816
OpenAlexW2040123332
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited35

This article seeks to provide a textured and nuanced conception of the first Asian-African Conference (18-24 April 1955) by structuring four simultaneous, "mosaic" perspectives (for India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines) of that multifaceted event. By eschewing hegemonic "Cold War" and "triumphalist" interpretations, one purposefully avoids a rehash of the roles of the USA and the Soviet Union. Their role, in this study, is peripheral. This article highlights the complexity of the conference by a series of analytical snap shots, multiple focuses, recollections and memories, which emphasise the frequently neglected Babel-like environment of the Bandung Conference. The resulting analysis provides capsules of self-contained experiences rather than one unifying story. Ultimately, the highly contentious and disparate viewpoints that the participants brought to the conference underscored the difficulties that Cold War superpowers experienced in creating political-military blocs friendly to their cause. Third World countries, by the nature of their decolonization process and their political expediencies, succeeded in preventing both the superpowers from creating monolithic blocs. Key Words: Bandung ConferenceCold WarIndonesiaPhilippinesChinaIndia Acknowledgement The author wishes to thank Hong Lysa, Daniel K. R. Crosswell and the journal's anonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on the various drafts of this essay. Notes Carlos P. Romulo (1956 Romulo, C. P. 1956. The Meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. [Google Scholar]) provided the best example of such a conventional approach at the height of the Cold War. Seeing a particular historical narrative as "fractured" has been observed by others. Bruce Cumings (2005 Cumings, B. 2005. Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: Norton. [Google Scholar]), for example, wrote about the modern history of Korea in this way: "Korea presents the Westerner not with a smooth narrative of progress toward industrial mastery, however, but with a fractured, shattered 20th century history." In his slim book, Karl Reyman (1959 Reyman, K. 1959. Gongdang yunyong xiadi yafei huiyi [The Chinese Communist's Control of the Asian-African Conference], Jiulong: Ziyou chubanshe. [Google Scholar]), a Czech who was acerbically anti-communist, cautioned readers of communist China's possible treachery among NAM members. He also argued that a second Asian-African Conference would harm the free world. Reyman's treatise was one of those anti-communist tracts churned out at the height of the Cold War. Here, the Spirit of Bandung was depicted as an insidious, communist-corrupted ideology and Reyman was bitterly against the PRC's success at the Bandung Conference. The Republic of China government (Taiwan) published Reyman's work and distributed it widely. Ironically, the Soviets at this point in time, would have heartily agreed with Reyman's demonisation of the PRC. See Chen Jian's (1996 Chen, Jian. 1996. "Sino-American Relations in China,". In Pacific Passage, Edited by: Cohen, Warren I. 3–35. New York: Columbia University Press. [Google Scholar]) "state of the field" survey of China's scholarly works on Sino-US relations. The Five Principles are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. This authoritative volume is the result of the work of 17 scholars of the CCP Central Archives and the Chinese journal Dang de Wenxian[Party Documents]. It was commissioned by the publisher to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Zhou Enlai. The Chinese agreed to waive any legal claim or responsibility for Indonesian-Chinese, while Indonesia agreed that Indonesian citizenship could be granted to ethnic Chinese who remained in Indonesia. The Sastroamijoyo government and the army faced off over the issue of the appointment of the new Chief of Staff. Colonel Zulkifli Lubis was initially the government's choice. Lubis, however, had angered Defence Minister Iwa Kusumasumantri over some military appointments and Lubis' name was dropped. However, the disgruntled officer was able to obtain army and the opposition parties' support to topple the hapless government. See, for example, Abdulgani (1964 Abdulgani, R. 1964. Bandung Spirit: Moving on the Tide of History, Bandan Penerbit: Prapantja. [Google Scholar]) in his various literal conceptualisations of the Bandung Spirit. These two methods were suggested by President Eisenhower in a joking manner. However, in the light of the later bombing of the Kashmir Princess airliner (1955) and the assassination of South Vietnam President Diem (1963), somehow the joke reflected the hubris of US foreign policy (Tsang, 1994 Tsang, S. 1994. "Target Zhou Enlai: The 'Kashmir Princess' Incident of 1955,". The China Quarterly, 139: 766–782. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar

China · Cold war · Decolonization · Hegemony · Media studies · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Viewpoints · Communism, Protests, Social Movements · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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