Russell on Incomplete Symbols

Bibliographic Data

ID4749003
AuthorsBryan Pickel (0000-0002-5686-8429, Universitat de Barcelona, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume8
Issue10
Pages909-923
Publication date2013-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12071
OpenAlexW1492345088
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited31

Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare their views on the relationship between language and the world. But Russell's exact characterization of incomplete symbols and the role they play in his philosophy are still disputed. In this paper, I trace the development of the notion of an incomplete symbol in Russell's philosophy. I suggest - against Kaplan, Evans, and others - that Russell's many characterizations of the notion of an incomplete symbol are compatible. To this end, I examine and reject arguments for the purported incompatibility between declaring an expression to be incomplete and incorporating that symbol into a compositional semantic theory. I then examine how Russell puts the notion of an incomplete symbol to use in metaphysics

Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Programming language · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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