A Case for Geoeconomic Restraint
Offensive Realism and the Inflated Threat of Chinese Economic Initiatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4763414 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dong Jung Kim (0000-0002-2395-4208, Sogang University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1421-1441 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Geopolitics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1465-0045 • E-ISSN: 1557-3028 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/14650045.2020.1719071 |
| OpenAlex | W3003675282 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 42 |
Many analysts and practitioners argue that the United States should actively engage in geoeconomic competition with China. This article suggests that an argument against this claim can be counter-intuitively derived from offensive realism – an influential international relations theory known for its pessimism on great power relations. Offensive realism suggests that a great power should try to maximize its material capacity and pay careful attention to the balance of material power between major states. It also suggests that a great power should avoid spending its limited resources in influence or legitimacy competition in the peripheries. In this context, offensive realism prescribes that the United States should not actively oppose Chinese economic initiatives unless those projects have meaningful impact on the bilateral balance of power and its security. On the contrary, Washington should encourage China to expand its investments in geoeconomic initiatives since China is likely to end up spending a large amount of its resources in regions that do not have significant implications to the balance of material power. For offensive realists, a great power should take balance of power competition in major regions seriously, not influence competition around the globe. Accordingly, the United States should restrain itself and avoid geoeconomically confronting China
China · Economic interdependence · Economics · Great power · Legitimacy · Offensive · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Realism · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |