Does Moral Philosophy Pay

Thirteen years ago Professor G. E. M. Anscombe gave reasons for thinking that it is not at present profitable for us to do moral philosophy. The steady flow of books since then shows how little notice was taken. The three I shall be considering in this article present an opportunity to consider the case she made and its continuing relevance.Miss Anscombe's essay, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', is included in The Definition of Morality, together with twelve others which are meant to hang from the same peg: the question, 'What is the meaning of "morality"?' The most interesting of them get up and walk away with the peg, opening up issues beyond the matters of usage which the editors tidily catalogue in their introduction. This is certainly true of Miss Anscombe's. Her quarrel with modern moral philosophers is not that they are wrong in the way they use or define 'moral' and 'morality', but that in the way they use them these terms mean nothing at all. She argues that the concept of obligation, with its related moral sense of'ought', which has been given pride of place by moral philosophers since the eighteenth century, is intelligible only within a law-conception of morality. To speak of a moral 'law', of being 'bound', 'obliged' and so on, makes no sense unless one believes that there is someone who issues the law. The decay of divine law as a basis for morality has left these terms bereft of content, but not, unfortunately, of their 'mesmeric force'. The smell remains for some time even when the gas-works has been dismantled. When 'ought' lacks the content provided by some actual law, telling a man that he ought not to commit adultery gives him no reason at all for not doing so

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