Nucleus and Shield
The Evolution of Social Structure in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4802540 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bjørn Lomborg (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 278 |
| Publication date | 1996-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Sociological Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-1224 • E-ISSN: 1939-8271 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2096335 |
| OpenAlex | W2016320218 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 18 |
L'A. pose le probleme de l'evolution sociale dans un univers hobbesien. Il montre que dans ce cadre si les individus sont intrinsequement egoistes, la vie sociale peut etre consideree comme enfermee dans le dilemme du prisonnier. Il s'interroge donc sur la possibilite de la cooperation sociale. Il s'efforce de caracteriser et d'isoler la nature des interactions sociales que l'on peut modeliser. Il s'interesse aux structures microsociologiques comme aux structures macrosociologiques qui les sous-tendent. Il examine l'approche de J. S. Coleman qui tente de relativiser la situation du dilemme du prisonnier. Il etudie les presuppositions de la theorie des jeux concernant le comportement des individus. Il construit un modele de simulation permettant de suivre le comportement des individus pris dans un dilemme du prisonnier et d'evaluer les probabilites de cooperation dans le temps
Biology · Dilemma · Geometry · Iterated function · Nucleus · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Shield · Sociology · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Neuroscience · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Paleontology · Psychology
Methodological Investigations in Agent-Based Modelling
Die normative Struktur von Solidarität und Ungleichheit
Embedded trust
Political ideologies as social strategies
Modellierung in der Soziologie — heutige Fragestellungen und Perspektiven
Sensitivity Analysis in the Social Sciences
Simulation for the Social Scientist
Association Memberships and Generalized Trust
Social Emergence
On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory
Reciprocity in groups
Individual Strategy Update and Emergence of Cooperation in Social Networks
Prolegomenon to the relation between social theory and method
From Factors to Actors
Legal Institutions and Informal Networks
Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations
Identity, Interest and Emergent Rationality
The Normative Structure of Solidarity and Inequality
The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes
Using simulation to develop testable functionalist explanations
Simulation in Sociology
Simulation Modeling in Political Science
A Typology for Understanding the Connections Among Different Forms of Social Capital
The Advantage of Being Moderately Cooperative
Why Sociology Should Use Agent Based Modelling
Artificial Societies
Combining Ethnography and Game Theory Using Simulation
Computational Models of Social Forms
The Evolution of Norms
Toward a Role-Theoretic Conception of Embeddedness
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems
Evolutionary Games in Economics
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Games and Decisions
An evolutionary theory of economic change
Governing the Commons
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Community, Anarchy and Liberty
Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
The Limits of Reciprocity
An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind
Social Networks and Collective Action
Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action
| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,97 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2023 (29) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |