Moral Discourse and Descriptive Properties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4804426 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brad Majors (University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 220 |
| Pages | 475-494 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00412.x |
| OpenAlex | W1985813259 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 2 |
I discuss a strategy for grounding ethical naturalism propounded by Frank Jackson and more recently by Allan Gibbard: that the undisputed supervenience of the moral upon the natural (or descriptive) entails that moral properties are natural (or descriptive) properties. I show that this strategy falls foul of certain indubitable constraints governing natural kinds; and I then rebut some objections. The upshot is that no viable strategy for supporting ethical naturalism is to be found along these lines. This result has additional consequences, both for Jackson's attempt to accommodate ethical discourse into the natural world, and for Gibbard's purported ‘meta‐ethical synthesis
Descriptive research · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology · Naturalism · Social science · Sociology · Supervenience · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Ethics in medical practice · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism
Non-Naturalism and Reference
Standing up for supervenience
Moral Facts as Configuring Causes
The moral fixed points
The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism
Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World
Are normative properties descriptive properties
Hume's Dictum and Metaethics
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,45 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2023 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |