Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity

Bibliographic Data

ID4813644
AuthorsSteven D Hale, Steven D Hales (Bloomsburg University), Timothy A Johnson
Year2003
Volume53
Issue213
Pages524-539
Publication date2003-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00329
OpenAlexW2097123254
LanguageEN
Citations received12

There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and exist only partly at each moment of their existence. We argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by special relativity, and it can accommodate a relativistic world only at a high price not worth paying. Perdurantism, on the other hand, fits beautifully with our current scientific understanding of the world. We use only the implications of the Lorentz transformations, without appeal to geometrical interpretations, dimensional analogies or auxiliary premises like temporal eternalism

Physics · Special relativity · Theoretical physics · Theory of relativity · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Relativity and Gravitational Theory · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life

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