Luftwaffe by Williamson Murray

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 159 The author then analyzes this technical success and tactical fail­ ure in depth: the German’s superior chemical industry could reason­ ably expect to out-produce the Allies, at least in the short run, but with the U.S. entry into the war this advantage would disappear. At the tactical level, shifting winds tended to blow the gas cloud back over German lines, and the prevailing wind direction favored the Al­ lies. In short, the German High Command had failed to think through the tactical and strategic implications of gas warfare before introducing gas as a weapon. Nor had they anticipated the speed with which the British, using experience garnered in coal-mining res­ cue work, would develop protective respirators employing activated charcoal filters. In a brief review, one cannot hope to develop all the facets of this remarkably rich book, but mention of a few may suggest its scope. Is the most effective use of gas to kill or to injure physically or psychologically? Is gas best used offensively or defensively? Did thinking offensively delay the introduction of mustard gas, an effec­ tive interdiction weapon? Is gas best delivered by clouds on the wind or by projectiles? Why were the military authorities so slow in perfecting test and evaluation procedures and cost-effectiveness sta­ tistics? The author concludes that gas warfare until 1918 was “largely a waste of effort” that in that year helped the Germans more than the Allies but did not win any battles (p. 280). I. B. Holley, Jr. Prof. Holley is a member of the Department of History at Duke University. His best-known work is Ideas and Weapons, which illuminates the importance of military doc­ trine, a subject on which he writes extensively. Luftwaffe. By Williamson Murray. Baltimore, Md.: Nautical & Avia­ tion Publishing Company of America, 1985. Pp. xiv+337; illustra­ tions, maps, tables, notes, appendixes, bibliography, index. $21.95. Myjoint review of Williamson Murray’s Strategyfor Defeat: The Luft­ waffe 1933—1945 (Air University Press, 1983) and Giulio Douhet’s classic, The Command of the Air, appeared in the January 1986 issue of Technology and Culture (pp. 174-77). Luftwaffe, published two years after Strategy for Defeat, is in fact the former book reissued with minimal changes, primarily in the more finished appearance of its charts and tables. The author’s examination of German air strategy from 1933 to 1945 and the course of the air war from 1939 to 1945 advances sev­ eral theses based on his extensive research in available sources. Previ­ ous interpretations have contended that the Luftwaffe before 1939 was subordinate to the dictates of the army and navy and that it was intended as a tactical arm. Murray asserts instead that 160 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Germany’s economy and geographical and strategic situation con­ strained the Luftwaffe’s development and role within a grand strat­ egy encompassing all three forces and including a prominent place for strategic bombing. Yet ultimately the Nazi High Command, in­ cluding the Luftwaffe chiefs, failed in the realm of grand strategy, ignored the industrial, economic, and political realities of war, pursued an unfocused aerial strategy, and consequently insured Germany’s defeat. In particular, the failure of the Luftwaffe’s lead­ ers to mobilize aviation production in 1940—41, which Murray consid­ ers the decisive year of the war, insured the Luftwaffe’s loss of the air war over Europe in 1943—44. Murray correctly emphasizes the importance of attrition, the ero­ sion of matériel and particularly of the quality and quantity of flight crews from 1940 on, as production and training failed to keep pace with the losses incurred in an expanding aerial war on as many as three fronts. The book provides a detailed survey and analy­ sis of the Luftwaffe’s grim struggle and sets the German aerial ef­ fort in the contexts of the struggle on the Eastern front and of the Allied bombing campaign. Murray notes the importance of production and technology in modern warfare in general and aerial warfare in particular and pro­ vides a wealth of production statistics in his numerous tables. Yet his stimulating book does not discuss

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