Minimalism and the Value of Truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4835607 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Patrick Lynch (0000-0001-9535-6461, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 217 |
| Pages | 497-517 |
| Publication date | 2004-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00369.x |
| OpenAlex | W2074713394 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 8 |
Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T‐schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true i. p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project
Epistemology · Linguistics · Minimalism (technical communication) · Proposition · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Truth condition · Truth value · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Emergent Truth and a Blind Spot, An Argument against Physicalism
Truth and Social Reality
The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence
Conceptually engineering the post-truth crisis
Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism
Realism, inferential semantics, and the truth norm
Is truth a normative concept
Alethic pluralism and the value of truth
The value of minimalist truth
Minimalism about truth
Truth and its uses
| Citations per year | 0.55 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |