From E = K to Scepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4847715 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Clayton Littlejohn (0000-0003-2126-6169, Southern Methodist University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 233 |
| Pages | 679-684 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.562.x |
| OpenAlex | W2076898988 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 3 |
In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about the external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Nothing · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.36 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2024 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |